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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tional question be decided when raised. Because of the uncertainty
of the application of the immunity doctrine, to decide the issue of juris-
diction first would avoid prolonging the litigation in a substantial num-
ber of cases.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity with all of its subtleties is one
which frequently confronts the federal courts. It has been suggested
that a test avoiding all fictions should be adopted, that only those suits
should be dismissed which would unduly interfere with government
operations.5 s This measure of jurisdiction would certainly be more
in keeping with the fundamental nature of a form of government which
derives its authority and power from consent of the governed; however,
such a test is not without shortcomings. If adopted it would place
upon the courts the heavy burden of predicting the effect of each action
upon the operations of the governmental machinery involved, and the
necessity of weighing that effect against the interests of the plaintiff
and all persons similarly situated.
There is little, if any, likelihood of Congressional action on this
subject; therefore, future cases will in all probability continue the same
pattern of case by case adjudication and application of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity to the peculiar facts of the litigation before the
court.
R. G. HALL, JR.
Insurance-Recovery under Windstorm Clauses
As a result of the recent hurricane which struck North Carolina,
many problems will arise as to what damages are recoverable under
windstorm clauses of insurance policies. This note is an attempt to
set forth some of the rules of law applicable to windstorm clauses.
The extended coverage endorsement generally in use in North
Carolina covers direct loss by windstorm. Expressly excepted are
all losses caused directly or indirectly by water, whether driven by
wind or not, unless the water entered the building through an opening
made by wind. Damage to seawalls, docks, piers, boathouses, cabanas,
and bulkheads is also excepted.'
(1940); Royal Sundries Corp. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 136 (E. D. N. Y.
1953).
"Advocated in Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovcreigis
Immunity Doctrine, 59 HAV. L. REv. 1060 (1946).
'An example of the usual extended coverage endorsement approved by the
North Carolina Fire Insurance Rating Bureau is: "EXTENDED COVERAGE:
In consideration of the premium for this coverage shown on the first page of
this policy, and subject to provisions and stipulations (hereinafter referred to
as 'provisions') herein and in the policy to which this endorsement is attached
including riders and endorsements thereon, the coverage of this policy is extended
to include direct loss by Windstorm, Hail. ...
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The term windstorm means a wind of unusual violence. It is a
storm characterized by high winds with little or no precipitation. It
must be more than an ordinary gust of wind, no matter how prolonged.
It need not have the twirling features of a cyclone or tornado, but it
must assume the aspect of a storm-that is, an outburst of tumultuous
force. 2
Accepting this as a definition of a windstorm, the courts have ex-
perienced difficulty in finding a standard by which the facts can be
measured to determine whether a windstorm did in fact occur.3 A
few courts have adopted as a standard the velocity of the wind.4 One
court approved an instruction to the effect that the wind had reached
windstorm proportions if the wind was blowing with sufficient force
to blow down a tree.5
"PROVISIONS APPLICABLE ONLY TO WINDSTORM AND HAIL:
This Company shall not be liable for loss caused directly or indirectly by (a)
frost or cold weather or (b) ice (other than hail), snowstorm, waves, tidal
wave, high water or overflow, whether driven by wind or not.
"This Company shall not be liable for loss to the interior of the building or
the property covered therein caused, (a) by water, rain, snow, sand or dust,
whether driven by wind or not, unless the building covered or containing the
property covered shall first sustain an actual damage to roof or walls by the
direct force of wind or hail and then shall be liable for loss to the interior of
the building or the property covered therein as may be caused by water, rain,
snow, sand or dust entering the building through openings in the roof or walls
made by direct action of wind or hail or (b) by water from sprinkler equip-
ment or other piping, unless such equipment or piping be damaged as a direct
result of wind or hail.
"Unless liability therefor is assumed in the form attached to this policy by
separate and specific item(s), or by endorsement hereon, this Company shall
not be liable for damage to the following property; (a) Cloth awnings and
their frames; (b) fences; (c) seawall, property line and similar walls; (d)
greenhouses, hothouses, slathouses, trellises, pergolas, cabanas and outdoor equip-
ment pertaining to the service of the premises: (e) wharfs, docks, piers, boat-
houses, bulkheads or other structures located over or partially over water and
the property therein or thereon."
-Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Co., 151 Iowa 73, 130 N. W. 177
(1911) ; Sabatier Bros. v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 152 So. 85 (La. App.
1934); Metropolitan Ice Cream Co. v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 358 Mo. 727,
210 S. W. 2d 700 (1949); Schaeffer v. Northern Assur. Co., 177 S. W. 2d 688
(Mo. App. 1944); Lunn v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 184 Tenn. 584,
201 S. W. 2d 978 (1947).
'Pearson v. Aroostook County Patrons Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 101 A. 2d 183, 186
CMe. 1953). "To say that a windstorm must be 'an outburst of tumultuous
force' or 'a wind of unusual violence,' hardly more than states the difficulty.
The vital questions are, accepting this definition of a windstorm, how much
force or violence of wind does it take to make a windstorm, and how may it
be measured."
'Bogalusa Gin & Warehouse Co. v. Western Assurance Co., 199 La. 715, 718-
719, 6 So. 2d 740, 741 (1942) (The court said that the testimony of witnesses
from the United States Weather Bureau is to the effect that the average wind
velocity necessary to constitute a windstorm is twenty-seven miles per hour.
The preponderance of evidence here is that the velocity was not less than thirty-
five miles per hour. "Such being the case, the velocity of the wind reached the
degree of a windstorm."); Clark v. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp., 39 N. Y. S.
2d 377 (City Ct. 1943) (a twenty-eight mile per hour wind held not to con-
stitute a windstorm).
'Atlas Assur. Co., Ltd., v. Lies, 70 Ga. App. 162, 27 S. E. 2d 791 (1943).
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The modem trend is for the courts to hold that to constitute a
windstorm, the wind must be of sufficient force and violence to damage
the insured property.6 The courts of Kentucky and Maine have adopt-
ed this view with the qualification that the insured property must be
in a reasonable state of repair.7 A result of this interpretation is that
a plaintiff, who proves damages resulting from wind, has established
the right to recover without further evidence that the wind was a
storm or outburst of tumultuous force.
The question of whether a windstorm did in fact occur is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury.8
The insured, in order to recover, must bring himself within the
terms of the policy by proving that the loss was occasioned by wind-
Contra: Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Board of Education of Town
of Rosedale, 201 Okla. 250, 204 P. 2d 982 (1949).8 Albert Lea Ice & Fuel Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 58 N. W. 2d
614 (Minn. App. 1953); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Education,
201 Okla. 250, 204 P. 2d 982 (1945); Adams Apple Products Corp. v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 170 Pa. Super. 269, 85 A. 2d 702 (1952); Gerhard v.
Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 246 Wis. 625, 18 N. W. 2d 336 (1945).TDruggist Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 254 S. W. 2d 691 (Ky. App. 1953); Old
Colony Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 256 S. W. 2d 362 (Ky. App. 1953); Pearson v.
Aroostook County Patrons Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 101 A. 2d 183 (Me. 1954).
8 Pearl Assur. Co. v. Stacey Bros. Gas. Const. Co., 114 F. 2d 702 (6th Cir.
1940); Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Co., 151 Iowa 73, 130 N. W. 177
(1911) (The court found that a windstorm had occurred when witnesses testi-
fied that the wind lasted all day, that it was the hardest they had experienced,
that well built windmills in the locality were blown down and that visibility
was poor.); Druggist Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 254 S. W. 2d 691 (Ky. App. 1953)
(The evidence establishing a windstorm was the testimony that the witness was
awakened during the night by the sound of the wind and the falling of a wall
and testimony of other witnesses that the wind was blowing hard. There was
no damage to other houses in the vicinity. Although there was evidence that
some of the witnesses observed neighbors patching roofs, there was no indica-
tion that the patching was made necessary by the damage occurring on the
night in question. Under the standard that a windstorm is a wind of sufficient
violence to be capable of damaging the property, assuming the property in
reasonable repair, the evidence was held sufficient to take the question of
whether the damage was done by windstorm to the jury.); Sabatier Bros. v.
Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 152 So. 85 (La App. 1934) (The insured build-
ing was destroyed, hut there was no other damage in the vicinity. The court
said that the evidence indicated that the wind was merely blowing in gusts
and did not rise to the heights of tumultuous violence.) ; Metropolitan Ice Cream
Co. v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 358 Mo. 727, 210 S. W. 2d 700 (1949) (The
court found the jury justified in finding that a windstorm had occurred from
testimony that a witness was awakened twice by the noise of the wind and the
rattling of windows. The wind seemed violent when riding in the car and
papers were seen blowing in the street. The wind was heard whistling between
the buildings. The records of the United States Weather Bureau showed a
maximum wind velocity of twenty-three miles per hour and that the velocity
was seventeen miles per hour at the time of the damage. A tower on top of
a building collapsed, and evidence showed that the tower was improperly con-
structed. The court said that if the insurer wished to limit his liability to
winds of certain velocity, he should so state in the policy.); George A. Hoag-
land & Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. A., 131 Neb. 105, 267 N. W. 239 (1936)
(On conflicting evidence of whether the storm was accompanied by winds of
fifteen or thirty miles per hour, the question was for the jury as to whether the
wind amounted to a windstorm.)
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storm.9 This burden is sustained upon establishing by a fair prepon-
derance of evidence that the windstorm was the efficient cause of the
damage incurred.' 0 This can be established by direct and circum-
stantial evidence and opinions of expert and skilled witnesses.,'
When the insured offers evidence tending to show that the damage
was occasioned by one of the causes insured against, the burden shifts
to the insurer to show that the loss was caused by an excluded cause.'2
The burden is on the insurer to bring the loss within the exception.
1 3
Direct loss by windstorm means that the windstorm must be the
proximate or efficient cause of the loss.14 The term "efficient," as ap-
plied to windstorm coverage, is not expressly defined but it is often
used in the cases, and where used it meins that the wind must be the
direct cause-the predominating cause without which the loss would
not have occurred. The wind of itself must have been capable of pro-
ducing the loss without combining with some other cause.15 The court
in Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Muhle construed the policy to mean that
"if the damages sued for were caused by wind, and the damage sued
for would have resulted from the wind alone without the presence of
water, recovery was proper."'
6
These suggested meanings are not quite comprehensive and are not
applicable in certain situations. They leave out the case where an
object is projected against the insured building by the wind.' 7 Re-
covery is denied, however, when the damage is occasioned by water
0 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895);
Sabatier Bros. v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 152 So. 85 (La. App. 1934);
Styborski v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 169 Pa. Super. 452, 82 A. 2d 543 (1952) ;
Marks v. Lumbermens Ins. Co., 160 Pa. Super. 66, 49 A. 2d 855 (1946).
" Peritp v. Northern Ins. Co. of N. Y., 189 Misc. 204, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 611
(Sup. Ct. 1948); La Bris v. Western Nat. Ins. Co., 59 S. E. 2d 263 (W. Va.
1950•
Loyola University v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of N. Y., 93 F. Supp.
186 (E. D. La. 1951), aff'd, 196 F. 2d 169 (5th Cir. 1952).
'Kinney v. Farmers Mut. F. & Ins. Soc., 159 Iowa 490, 141 N. W. 706
(1913).
"Jordan v. Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins., 151 Iowa 73, 130 N. W. 177 (1911)
(One of the main reasons for the trial court's finding loss by windstorm was
the failure of the insurer to show that the exception applied.); Polansky v.
Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n of Ill., 238 N. C. 427, 78 S. E. 2d 213 (1954)
(automobile policy); Collins v. U. S. Casualty Co., 172 N. C. 543, 90 S. E.
585 (1916) (health policy). Contra: Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222 S. W.
973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920).
" Trexler Lumber Co. v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 289 Pa.
13, 136 Atl. 856 (1927).
10 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895).
10208 F. 2d 191, 194 (8th Cir. 1954).
17 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895)
(vessels were blown against the insured bridge) ; Queens Ins. Co. v. I-udnut
Co., 8 Ind. App. 22, 35 N. E. 397 (1893) (boat blown by wind against in-
sured building); Gerhard v. Travelers F. Ins. Co., 246 Wis. 625, 18 N. W. 2d
336 (1945) (ice blown from a nearby lake against cottage).
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driven by wind,'8 or hail driven by wind under a policy excepting loss
by hail. 19
It is not necessary in all cases to prove injury by direct impact of
the wind or by the wind projecting some object against the insured
property.20 Recovery was permitted when a horse, terrified by the
blowing in of a barn door, broke his halter and forced his foot through
a timber in the barn so that he could not extricate himself and died
from injuries and exhaustion.21 Recovery was permitted also for the
displacement of insured property and damage resulting from its being
deposited in water.
22
Whether the windstorm is the efficient cause of the loss is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury.
28
8 Newark Trust Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 237 Fed. 788 (3d Cir. 1916)
(The court would not accept the insured's argument that because the wind drove
the water agiinst the house the wind was the proximate cause of the loss.).
" Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 64 Kan. 115, 67 Pac. 440 (1902).20Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Co., 153 Iowa 73, 130 N. W. 177
(1911).
21Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Anderson, 81 Ind. App. 124,
130 N. E. 419 (1921).
'Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Sikes, 197 Okla. 137, 168 P. 2d 1016 (1946).
"fiHome Ins. Co. v. Sherrill, 174 F. 2d 945 (5th Cir. 1949) (Eyewitnesses
testified that they saw the roof of the insured building blown off and the wvalls
collapse before the water rose to the window sills or the waves began to beat
against the building. The evidence was held sufficient for the jury to find loss
by windstorm.) ; Pearl Assurance Co. v. Stacey Bros. Gas. Const. Co., 114 F. 2d
702 (6th Cir. 1940); North British & Merchantile Ins. Co. v. Sciandra, 54
So. 2d 764 (Ala. 1952) ; Ebert v. Pacific Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 40 So. 2d 40 (La.
App. 1949) (The court overruled the finding of the trial court that the loss
resulted from water rather than wind.); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Albers, 167
Md. 599, 175 At. 597 (1934) (A windstorm of fifty miles per hour caused the
island on which the insured house was located to be inundated. The house was
on higher ground and more subjected to the wind. There was evidence that
lower houses were not as damaged and that trees had been blown down.);
Anderson v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 231 Minn. 469, 43 N. W. 2d 807 (1950);
Brown v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co., 263 S. W. 2d 893 (Mo. App. 1954); Schaeffer v.
Northern Assur. Co., 177 S. W. 2d 688 (Mo. App. 1944) (Where a windstorm
lasted three days in which the velocity of the wind reached forty miles per
hour the first day, thirty-one miles per hour the second, and fourteen miles
per hour the third, and cracking noises were heard throughout the period, the
evidence warranted the finding that the sliding of the roof was directly caused
by windstorm.); Protzmann v. Eagle Fire Co. of N. Y., 272 App. Div. 319, 71
N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1st Dep't 1948) (Photographs of the insured property before
and after the windstorm indicated that a bulkhead which protected the house
had been washed away, and conveyed the impression that the front of the
insured's house was undermined by the ocean. The verdict of the jury that
the loss was caused by wind was held contrary to the weight of the evidence.)
Miller v. Farmers Mutual L. Ins. Asso., 198 N. C. 572, 152 S. E. 684 (1930)
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Sikes, 197 Okla. 137, 168 P. 2d 1016 (1946)
(evidence held sufficient for jury to find that the house was blown from its
foundation into a flooded street rather than carried by water); Murphy v.
Insurance Co. of N. A., 355 Pa. 442, 50 A. 2d 217 (1947); Trexler Lumber
Co. v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co., 289 Pa. 13, 136 AtI. 856 (1927); Styborski v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 169 Pa. Super. 452, 82 A. 2d 543 (Super. Ct. 1952);
Marks v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., 160 Pa. Super. 66, 49 A. 2d 855 (Super. Ct.
1946) (The peak wind velocity for a five minute period was 82 miles per hour.
There were no eyewitnesses to the damage done to insured's house, but witnesses
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Frequently the loss to the insured property is occasioned by a com-
bination of causes. A cause not insured against may join with the
wind in different degrees to produce the loss. These degrees may be
classified as follows:
(1) Contributing: The general rule laid down by the courts is
that if the cause designated in the policy is the efficient cause of the
loss, recovery may be had though other causes contributed.2 4  The
word "contributed" is used in the sense that it is a minor, secondary
cause of the loss. 2 5  Recovery for loss by a contributing cause is not
permitted when the loss attributable to it can be ascertained. In this
situation, recovery is limited to the damage caused by the efficient cause.
However, if the amount of the damage resulting from the contributing
cause cannot be determined, the party bearing the loss for the pre-
dominant cause is liable for the entire loss.28 It would seem that the
general rule stated above would obtain even though the contributing
cause was expressly excepted, and it has been so held.
27
The language used by some courts, however, seems to indicate
otherwise. In the only North Carolina case dealing with loss by wind-
storm, the court, after laying down the general rule, said: "Of course
the principal enunciated in these cases has no application if liability
for the contributing cause is expressly excluded by the terms of the
policy.
' 28
testified that it had been moved off its foundation and that other damage was
done to the house. Destruction was prevalent throughout the area.)."4 Miller v. Farmers Mutual L. Ins. Asso., 198 N. C. 572, 152 S. E. 684
(1930) (contributory damage by snow accumulated on roof).
2The word "contributed" is not always given this meaning by the courts.
In Palatine v. Petrovick, 235 S. W. 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) the court said
that water was at least a contributing cause and that was enough to bring it
within the exception in the policy. A further examination of the case reveals
that the court regarded water as a concurring rather than as a contributory
cause.
Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895).
27 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charlestown Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895)
(contributory damage by water) ; Jordan v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Co., 151
Io va 73, 130 N. W. 177 (1911) (contributory damage by snowstorm to the loss of
the cattle) ; Anderson v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 231 Minn. 469, 43 N. W. 2d
807 (1950) (contributory damage by snow accumulated on roof); Trexler
Lumber Co. v. Allemannia F. Ins. Co., 289 Pa. 13, 136 Atl. 856 (1927) (con-
tributory damage by snow accumulated on the roof); Providence Wash. Ins.
Co. v. Cooper, 223 S. W. 2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (The court found that
the finding of the jury, that no loss was caused by snow accumulated on the
roof, was without support in the evidence, but the court said that the insured
could recover if the windstorm was the efficient cause though other causes
contributed.). It will be noted that most of the cases stating the rule [that if
the cause designated in the policy is the efficient cause, recovery may be had
though there are contributing causes] involve contributory damage by snow.
Where water is involved as a factor in producing the loss, the courts usually
just discuss whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the
wind was the proximate cause.
2 8Miller v. Farmers Mutual L. Ins. Asso., 198 N. C. 574, 152 S. E. 684,
685 (1930).
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There are four reasons why the North Carolina Supreme Court
should not follow this deviation from the general proposition. The
statement is dictum because the contributing cause (snow) was not
expressly excepted in the policy. The cases cited for the dictum do
not support the distinction between an expressly excepted contributing
cause and a contributing cause which is not expressly excepted.20 The
cases cited by the North Carolina Supreme Court for the proposition
that if the cause designated in the policy is the efficient cause, recovery
may be had though other causes contributed, are cases in which re-
covery was permitted though an expressly excepted cause contributed
to the loss.30 Lastly, though the language of some courts seems to
support the distinction,81 no case has been found which on its facts
stands for the proposition that the general rule does not operate when
the contributing cause is expressly excepted.
(2) Concurrent: When the wind concurs with a cause not insured
against to produce the loss, and neither independently of the other
could have caused the damage, recovery is denied. The policy does
not permit recovery for loss by a combination of wind and some other
cause 2  There is no part of the loss which can be attributed to the
wind alone. Hence recovery is denied.
9 Holmes v. Phenix Ins. Co., 98 Fed. 240, 241 (8th Cir. 1899) (The court
approved an instruction to the jury that "all damage done to this building which
was the result of the injury done by hail is not recoverable in this action for
the reason that the policies exempt the company from damage or loss from
hail." But, it was found that the chief damage was caused by hail, the ex-
cepted cause. Here the efficient cause was the excepted cause. The court did
not have the precise question before it of whether recovery could be had if wind
were the efficient and hail were only a contributing cause.) ; National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 160 Ky. 802, 803, 170 S. W. 187, 187 (1914) (The in-
sured building was surrounded by water. High wind produced waves which
were driven by the wind against the building. Several witnesses testified that
the damage would not have occurred but for the water. The court said that
"the two concurring causes brought about the damage which neither by itself
alone would have produced." The whole tenor of the opinion is to the effect that
neither the wind nor water independently would have caused the loss. This
is not a case in which the water is only a contributing cause.).
" Phenix v. Charlestown Ins. Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895) (contribu-
tory damage by high water); Jordan v. Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Co., 151 Iowa
73, 130 N. W. 177 (1911) (a snowstorm contributed to the loss of cattle).
1 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Petrovick, 235 S. W. 929, 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)
(The court said that water was at least a contributing cause and that was
enough to bring it within the exception in the policy and prevent recovery.
Later in the opinion, when deciding on the motion for rehearing, the court
said: "If therefore under the facts appearing, the loss sustained by appellee
was to any extent due to water, the insurance company was not liable."
After reviewing the testimony of witnesses the court found that from the
evidence no other conclusion could be drawn than that the water did directly
or indirectly concur with the wind in destroying the house. The loss resulted
from the combined effects of wind and water. This was the actual holding and
indicates clearly that water was more than a contributing cause.).
" National F. Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 160 Ky. 802, 170 S. W. 187 (1914);
Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222 S. W. 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920); Palatine
v. Petrovick Ins. Co., 235 S. W. 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
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It would seem that when part of the loss is attributable to wind
alone, recovery may be had for that part, though the wind was not
the efficient cause of the entire loss. It is incumbent upon the insured
to prove the loss by the wind alone. This may logically be inferred
from the statement of the court in Loyola University v. Sun Under-
writers Ins. Co. of N. Y.3 "If the cause of the damage or destruction
be not the direct result of the wind alone, but the damage or destruc-
tion be caused by a combination of wind and water, and the damage
by either cannot be separated, then, there can be no recovery under
the policy, because the insured bears the burden of proving the cause
of the loss, and if it fails to make that proof, it cannot recover."
Loss to the interior of the insured building by water may be re-
covered upon proof that the water entered the building through an
opening made by the wind.34 The mere lapse of time between the
damage to the building and the entering of the water through the
opening made by the wind is not sufficient to take the loss outside the
coverage of the policy where efforts were made to have the building
repaired.- Reasonable means must be taken by the insured to prevent
damage to the interior after the opening is made.3 5
Liability for damage to the interior might depend upon the word-
ing of the policy. In Unobsky v. Continental Ins. Co., 86 the policy on
which the action was brought stated that the insurer would be liable
for rain, snow, sand or dust entering the building through an opening
made by the wind. It will be noted that the section of the extended
coverage endorsement dealing with loss to the interior did not include
water as does the extended coverage endorsement quoted in footnote
two herein. The court said that the policy only contemplated damage
by rain which directly entered the building through an opening made by
8393 F. Supp. 186, 190 (E. D. La. 1951), aff'd, 196 F. 2d 169 (5th Cir. 1952);
See also Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222 S. W. 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920).
11 Loyola University v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co., 93 F. Supp. 186 (E. D.
La. 1951), aff'd, 196 F. 2d 169 (5th Cir. 1953); National U. F. Ins. Co. v.
Harrower, 170 Ark. 694, 280 S. W. 256 (1926) ; Parish v. County F. Ins. Co.,
134 Neb. 563, 279 N. W. 170 (1938) (The evidence did not sustain the finding
of the jury that the windstorm caused the damage through which rain water
from the flooded street entered the building.); Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v.
Sikes, 197 Okla. 137, 168 P. 2d 1016 (1942) (rain entered building through
windows and doors blown out by wind); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Sproles, 73 S. W. 2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
1 Peerless Hosiery Co. v. Northern Ins. Co., 108 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1953),
aff'd, 199 F. 2d 957 (2d Cir. 1953) (A storm on November 25 damaged the
roof. Roof repairmen were unavailable. On December 7 rain entered the build-
ing through the opening made by the wind and damaged more goods. The
mere lapse of time did not preclude recovery. Recovery was denied, however,
because the insured failed to exercise reasonable care to protect the goods after
the initial damage to the roof. The policy placed a duty on the insured to
protect the property from further damage.) ; Auch v. New Hampshire Fire Ins.
Co., 65 Dauph. 335 (Pa. Co. Rep. 1954).
'G 147 Me. 249, 86 A. 2d 160 (1952).
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the wind. It did not cover damage caused by running surface water
from a rainstorm and melting snow which entered the building through
an opening made by the wind.
JOHN L. RENDLEMAN.
Legal Ethics-Enforceability of Canon Prohibiting Attorney's
Testimony on Behalf of Client
With regard to the propriety of an attorney's testifying for his
client, the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Asso-
ciation have this to say:
"When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely
formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instru-
ment and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer
should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client."'
The problem then arises as to whether such a provision is enforce-
able. Where an attorney, in a civil action, desires to testify for his
client, and the need of his testimony should have been apparent within
ample time for him to withdraw from the case, may the court enforce
this canon by refusing to permit the attorney to testify unless he with-
draws?
In the recent case of Millican v. Hunter,2 the Supreme Court of
Florida seems to answer this question in the affirmative. In that case
an action was brought to recover a commission for the sale of a radio
station. A question involved was whether there was sufficient evidence
to show that the property had been listed for sale. Plaintiff's attorney
sought to testify on this point in regard to statements made by one
defendant to another in his presence. Defendant objected to the admis-
sion of this testimony without the attorney's withdrawal, on the ground
that it violated the Code of Ethics.3 The trial court determined that
the testimony did not relate to formal matters and was not essential
to the ends of justice, and therefore sustained defendant's objection.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed.
It should be noted that a technical appraisal of the language of
Canon 19 seems to disclose two meanings of the word "withdrawal."
The phrase, "he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel,"
1 Canon 19. Practically every state has the same or a similar provision in-
corporated in its state bar association canons of ethics, or in its supreme court
or trial court rifles. Vol. 4 N. C. GEN. STAT., Rules, Regulations, etc., of the
North Carolina State Bar, Art. X, § 19 (1943), is identical.
273 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1954).
'31 FLA. STAT. ANN., Supreme Court Rule B, §(1), subd. 19 (1950). This
provision is identical to Canon 19, supra note 1.
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